February 20th 2025.
With the federal election quickly approaching on 23 February, Germany was hit with a shocking political event. The center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU), who had long been considered the main opposition party, joined forces with the extreme-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) to pass a motion in the national parliament. This marked the first time that the CDU had relied on the support of the far-right to make a decision. CDU leader Friedrich Merz, who was once seen as a surefire candidate for chancellor, defended the move by pointing fingers at other parties for their lack of willingness to address the issue of migration. However, the motion ultimately resulted in no concrete actions, but it did breach the previously strong "firewall" among democratic parties against the far-right. With this breach, Germany can no longer claim to be one of the last major European democracies to resist the normalization of far-right ideology. But what exactly does "normalization" mean and why should it be criticized?
To clarify, normalization is not the same as mainstreaming. Normalization specifically refers to justifying the acceptance of a transgression of an existing norm - in this case, collaborating with a far-right party that poses a threat to democracy. On the other hand, "mainstreaming" is a relative term that simply means something is widely accepted or common. For instance, forming a coalition with a far-right party or relying on their support to pass laws is a form of normalization, while adopting their rhetoric would be an example of mainstreaming. By bringing attention to certain issues and framing them in the way that the far-right wants, mainstreaming can also contribute to their normalization. This has long been a concern for social scientists, who have warned that if far-right issues dominate an election campaign, they will likely see success at the polls.
Since politicians who value democracy do not want to be seen as opportunistic, they often try to justify their normalization of far-right parties. One way is to simply claim that the norm is still in place and their actions do not violate it. This was the route taken by Merz, who argued that his goal was to decrease the AfD's share of the vote. However, this argument is not convincing, as rival parties often end up forming coalitions despite having conflicting agendas. Another option is to reject the norm altogether. For decades, the Italian Social Movement, which glorified Mussolini and Fascism, was considered beyond the pale and not a part of the "arco costituzionale" - the parties that essentially accepted Italy's post-war democratic constitution. But then came Silvio Berlusconi, a pioneer of normalization who suggested that the anti-fascist consensus was either outdated or a left-wing conspiracy. His party went on to form a coalition with the MSI in 1994.
Another approach is to maintain the norm, but argue that it does not apply to a particular party or is less important than other political priorities. This is the case with Italy's current Prime Minister, Giorgia Meloni, who began her political career in the MSI's youth organizations. Many politicians, both in and out of Italy, have deemed her Brothers of Italy party - a direct descendant of the MSI - a suitable partner. Even those who are hesitant to work with the most right-wing Italian government since World War II can justify their cooperation by citing larger issues, such as supporting Ukraine. We see a similar pattern in Austria, where the center-right People's Party initially ruled out working with Herbert Kickl, the leader of the far-right Freedom Party. However, after coalition talks with the center-left fell through, the People's Party turned to Kickl's party in the name of keeping Austria governable. While these talks also failed, the People's Party's willingness to negotiate with the far-right signaled to Austrians that Kickl was an acceptable choice, despite their previous promises not to normalize the far-right. This betrayal may have cost the People's Party the trust of voters who previously supported them based on their opposition to normalization.
In some cases, the far-right may still hold significant influence even without holding high office. For example, in Sweden, the current minority government is supported by the far-right Sweden Democrats. In France, the government - which also lacks a majority - is ultimately at the mercy of Marine Le Pen's National Rally. And in the Netherlands, the government includes the far-right, but its leader, Geert Wilders - who is the only official member of his party - remains in the background. Normalization is easier to identify than mainstreaming, but it requires a vigilant public and influential figures who will call out norm-breaking behavior instead of normalizing it. Voters often take cues from elites, so if a mainstream politician treats a far-right party as normal, public opinion is likely to follow suit.
Moreover, research has shown that this acceptance can spread beyond just supporters of the mainstream party and eventually reach the general public. Once normalization has occurred, it is extremely difficult to reverse. The significance of mainstreaming is slightly different, as politicians have some control over which issues they emphasize and how they address them. However, it is crucial that they learn not to uncritically adopt far-right talking points, which often promote hatred and are both morally and electorally detrimental.
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